There have been a number of estimates of the total amount of funding provided by the Federal Reserve to bail out the financial system. For example, Bloomberg recently claimed that the cumulative commitment by the Fed (this includes asset purchases plus lending) was $7. 
INTRODUCTION
There have been a number of estimates of the total amount of funding provided by the Federal Reserve to bail out the financial system. While the Fed at first refused to provide data on its bailout, the Congress-led by Senator Bernie Sanders-ordered the Fed to provide an accounting of its actions. Further, Bloomberg successfully pursued a Freedom of Information Act suit for release of detailed data. That resulted in a "dump" of 25,000 pages of raw data.
Bloomberg has recently claimed that the cumulative "spending" by the Fed (this includes asset purchases plus lending) was $7.77 trillion. However, the reports have not been sufficiently detailed to determine exactly what was included in that total.
We have conducted the most comprehensive investigation of the raw data to date. We find that the total spending is actually over $29 trillion. This is the first of a series of working papers in which we will present our results. We hope that other researchers will compare these results with their own, and are providing detailed break-downs to aid in such comparisons.
The extraordinary scope and magnitude of the recent financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] required an extraordinary response by the Fed in the fulfillment of its lender of last resort function (LOLR). The Fed's response did not disappoint; it was truly extraordinary. The purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive account of the Fed's response to the recent financial crisis. In an attempt to stabilize financial markets during the worst financial crisis since the Great Crash of 1929, the Fed engaged in loans, guarantees, and outright purchases of financial assets that were not only unprecedented (and of questionable legality), but cumulatively amounted to over twice current U.S. gross domestic product. The purpose of this paper is to delineate the essential characteristics and logistical specifics of the veritable "alphabet soup" of LOLR machinery rolled out to save the world financial system. We begin by making a brief statement regarding the methodology adopted in developing a suitable method with which to measure the scope and magnitude of the Fed's crisis response. The core of the paper will follow, outlining the unconventional facilities and programs aimed at stabilizing (or "saving") the existing financial structure. Only facilities in which transactions were conducted are considered in the discussion (some facilities were created but never used). The paper will conclude with a summary of the scope and magnitude of the Fed's crisis response. In later working papers we will continue to provide more detailed analysis of the spending.
METHODOLOGY
The explicit objective of LOLR operations is to halt the initiation and propagation of financial instability through the provision of liquidity to individual financial institutions or financial markets; or both. At any given moment in time, the available supply of ultimate liquidity is determined by the actions of the Fed and the U.S. Treasury. As the LOLR to solvent financial institutions, the Fed has traditionally found it satisfactory to accomplish its LOLR responsibility through conventional channels. The conventional tools are threefold. When acting as the LOLR, the Fed can increase the availability of liquidity by lending directly to institutions through the discount window; transactions of this nature are conducted at the initiative of participants. It can also make the terms upon which it lends to institutions more generous by decreasing the rate it charges for borrowing or lengthening the repayment period for loans. In recent years, however, preoccupation with control of the money stock has shifted emphasis from measures conducted at the initiative of the borrower to those undertaken at the initiative of the Fed. This new line of thinking holds that the provision of liquidity in times of crisis should be executed through the medium of open market operations. This line of thought argues that the market mechanism will efficiently allocate liquidity to those who have the greatest need during times of heightened demand. And so this third method has come to dominate in Fed actions.
In response to the gathering financial storm, the Fed acted quickly and aggressively through conventional means by slashing the federal funds rate from a high of 5. However, the efficacy of the Fed's conventional LOLR tools had little appreciable effect during the initial stages of the recent financial crisis. Moreover, the period of moderation brought about by such measures was of relatively short duration. These actions largely failed to ameliorate rapidly worsening conditions in opaque markets for securitized products such as mortgage backed securities (MBS).
In an attempt to counter the relative ineffectiveness of its conventional LOLR tools, the Fed designed and implemented a host of unconventional measures, unprecedented in terms of size or scope and of questionable legality. The goal of these unconventional measures was to explicitly improve financial market conditions and, by improving the intermediation process, to stabilize the U.S. economy as a whole. The authorization of many of these unconventional measures would require the use of what was, until the recent crisis, an ostensibly archaic section of the Federal Reserve Act-Section 13(3), which gave the Fed the authority "under unusual and exigent circumstances" to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
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In an attempt to halt growing financial instability, the Fed ballooned its balance sheet from approximately $900 billion in September 2008 to over $2.8 trillion dollars as of today. Before moving on to an analysis of the characteristics of each of the facilities implemented by the Fed in its bailout, a methodological note is in order. We have elected to adopt a twofold approach to measuring the scale and magnitude of the Fed's actions during and since the financial crisis. The composition of the Fed's balance sheet is expressed in terms of stocks; that is, it reflects the Fed's asset and liability portfolio at a moment in time. However, the provision of liquidity in the form of reserves by the Fed in the purchase of assets manifests itself as a flow. The outstanding balance of assets and liabilities held by the Fed adjust as transactions are conducted. This is simply a definitional outcome of double-entry accounting.
When private sector economic units repay loans or engage in liquidity-absorbing transactions, the Fed's balance sheet shrinks. Conversely, when private sector agents participate in liquidityincreasing transactions with the Fed, the Fed's balance sheet increases in size.
The changing composition and size of the Fed's balance sheet offers great insight into the scope of the Fed's actions since the crisis. As new, unconventional programs were initiated, they represented a new way for the Fed to intervene in the financial system. Furthermore, given that many of the programs were specifically targeted at classes of financial institutions or markets, and later at specific financial instruments, we are able to identify the markets or individual financial institutions that the Fed deemed worthy of "saving." To account for changes in the composition of the Fed's balance sheet as transactions occur and are settled, we shall report two variables referencing the weekly influence of an unconventional facility on the outstanding (stock), and the weekly amount lent (flow). The amount outstanding adjusts due to the repayment process, but fails to capture the entire picture. The whole image emerges when we include the weekly amount lent. As will be seen, many of the unconventional actions taken by the Fed were the result of a targeted response to a particularly traumatic event. Given that the respective facilities reflect different terms of repayment, and that initial usage of a crisis facility after an adverse shock was large, the amount outstanding will often increase to a high level and remain there until transactions are unwound. This is captured by the aforementioned "spike" in the Fed's balance sheet. Considering the disparity between lending and repayment, special emphasis will be placed on the peak dates for the amounts lent and outstanding since such time periods were often associated with excessive turmoil in financial markets. However, this leaves us with a dilemma: How are we to measure the magnitude of the Fed's bailout?
Our attempt to capture the magnitude of the Fed's bailout is informed by the idea that when the Fed operates as LOLR, it interrupts the normal functioning of the market process Reverse Repos (Minsky 1986 To sum, there are three different measures which we will report; each of which is important in capturing a different aspect of the bailout. First, there is the size of the Fed's balance sheet at a point in time-the total of its assets and liabilities. That tells us how much ultimate liquidity the Fed has provided; it also gives some measure of the risks to the Fed (for example, by looking at its stock of risky assets purchased from banks). Next, there is the flow of lending over a period, as a new facility is created to deal with an immediate need for funds.
Spikes will indicate particular problems in the financial sector that required the Fed's intervention. Finally, there is the cumulative total of all the funds supplied by the Fed outside "normal" monetary policy operations, which gives an idea of the scope of the impact of the global financial crisis.
The Facilities (or the Big Bail)
Several times, the Fed has issued public statements arguing that its crisis response machinery was implemented sequentially and consists of three distinct "Stages." Each "Stage" can be broadly viewed as a response to the evolution of the crisis as it proliferated through financial markets. The characteristics of each facility within the different "Stages" were largely conditioned by a more or less shared set of objectives. 2 The presentation of the Fed's response as sequential responding to events is useful for the categorization of the unconventional LOLR operations. The rationale for and purpose of the programs initiated during the different "Stages"
is indeed chronologically associated with economic events. However, this approach has a major shortcoming in that it does not take into account actions on the part of the Fed directed at specific institutions. We have chosen to adopt the "Stages" approach due to its merit as a narrative explaining the Fed's response to major events over the course of the crisis, and were conducted with foreign-based institutions. TOP allowed participants to purchase the right but not the obligation to borrow funds if it became necessary. The TSLF and TOP facilities are important as they mark the first use by the Fed of the powers given under Section 13(3) of the FRA.
Eighteen primary dealers participated in the TSLF program, while only 11 accessed the TOP facility. Of the 18 participants that took part in the TSLF, TOP, or both, eight were foreign institutions. Table 8 presents the five largest TSLF participants, while Figure 7 shows that 51 percent of total borrowing was undertaken by foreign-based institutions. Figure 8 indicates that 86 percent of total borrowing was done by the nine largest program participants. Figure 9 shows for bankruptcy the following day should it not receive an emergency loan. In an attempt to find an alternative to the outright failure of Bear, negotiations began between representatives from Table 9 lists the five largest borrowers from the PDCF. Figure 11 captures the heavy usage of 6 Since the PDCF issued overnight loans, Figure 10 should be read carefully. The amount outstanding reflects only loans for one day, while the amount lent includes the total of loans for a week. and all monies owed to the RCF were repaid in full January 2011. Section 13(3) of the FRA was invoked to conduct each facility providing AIG direct assistance. Table 10 lists the specific total dollar amount for facilities providing AIG with assistance and the amount outstanding as of November 10, 2011. Table 14 , and comprise 41.7 ($29.6) percent of total borrowing. This relationship is expressed in Figure 20 . Figure   22 display the degree to which a few Too Big To Fail institutions received the preponderance of support from the Fed. We note in passing that the six largest foreign-based institutions would receive 36 percent ($10.66 trillion) of the total bailout. This is the first of what we intend to be a series of working papers on the Fed's bailout.
In this one, we have focused on an accounting of the funds spent, by facility. We have also tallied how much the largest institutions received. Finally, we have indicated where foreign institutions have received substantial help, including both foreign central banks as well as private banks. In subsequent papers we will provide more detail on some of the Fed's actions, and will also discuss implications concerning such matters as risks to the Fed and Treasury of losses due to the Fed's expenditures, as well as matters related to Congressional oversight and accountability of the Fed.
